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FIRST AMENDMENT CONTRADICTIONS AND
PATHOLOGIES IN DISCOURSE
Erica Goldberg*

A robust, principled application of the First Amendment produces contradictions
that undermine the very justifications for free speech protections. Strong free speech
protections are justified by the idea that rational, informed deliberation leads to
peaceful decision-making, yet our marketplace of ideas is crowded with lies,
reductive narratives, emotional appeals, and speech that leads to violence. Our
current First Amendment model creates pathologies in discourse, which I term
problems in speech quality and problems of speaker identity, that are exacerbated
in our modern age of easy communication. The reason for these pathologies lies in
the relationship between reason and emotion, both in human psychology and in First
Amendment doctrine. This relationship is complex, and there are personal,
psychological reasons that people are incentivized to engage in speech that is not
truth-oriented. However, the solution to these speech pathologies is not to
dramatically alter First Amendment doctrine, which, despite claims that the First
Amendment is ill-equipped to deal with modern problems, is needed now more than
ever.
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INTRODUCTION
Interpreting the First Amendment in a robust, principled way creates
seemingly unavoidable contradictions. A major justification for the broad free
speech protections enjoyed in the United States is that open discourse will lead to
the truth and to more rational, peaceful decision-making.1 Yet the First Amendment
enables speech and institutional freedoms that are often speech-suppressive and
corrosive to the process of rational deliberation. The application of the First
Amendment thus undermines its own justifications.
To ensure that people have access to truthful information upon which to
deliberate and peacefully resolve conflicts, courts have held that the First
Amendment protects lies and appeals to emotion that circumvent rational processes.2
Courts treat listeners as rational and truth-seeking,3 but speakers often exploit our
more instinctive or baser qualities, such as our cognitive and emotional biases and
our intellectual laziness. Courts also draw a line between speech and conduct,
protecting emotionally harmful speech yet allowing broad regulation of conduct,4 to
allow more speech into the marketplace of ideas and to favor speech over violent
solutions to conflict.5 Yet distorted, emotionally charged speech that does not fall
into an unprotected category has contributed to violent acts. The First Amendment’s
freedoms create pathologies in discourse that have corrupted our marketplace of
1.
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (establishing the influential “marketplace of ideas” metaphor in which
peaceful competition among competing viewpoints is the best test of an idea’s truth); see also
LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 9–10, 140–44 (1986) (contending that free
speech protections facilitate the development of society-wide tolerance); THOMAS EMERSON,
THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–7 (1970) (articulating peaceful conflict resolution
as a primary justification for free speech); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 33–39 (2d ed.
1859) (arguing that fulsome discussion leads to deeper appreciation of truth).
2.
See infra Part I.
3.
See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First
Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 805–16, 828–32 (2010).
4.
See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119–20 (2003); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 458 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
5.
See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Resurrecting Free Speech, 63 FORDHAM L. REV.
971, 976 (1995) (“The distinction between mind and body—or, as it is usually called in this
context, speech and conduct, or expression and action—holds that speech is privileged above
conduct in the sense that government may properly regulate the clash of bodies but not the
stirring of hearts and minds.”); see also Erica Goldberg, Emotional Duties, 47 CONN. L. REV.
809, 864 (2015) (“The somewhat blurry line between speech, which is presumptively
protected, and conduct, which is generally regulable, is premised at least in part on the notion
that pure speech is a communicative act that directly causes only emotional harm, whereas
conduct involves direct, physical, tangible interactions and harm.”).
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ideas with reductive, oversimplified speech, emotional appeals, and the promotion
of viewpoint intolerance.
Compounding this problem, and illustrating another important First
Amendment contradiction, is the behavior of our academic institutions. These
institutions, with First Amendment academic freedoms designed to foster new,
subversive ideas and inquiry, have become increasingly homogeneous in the views
they espouse and even impose on their students. As a way to uphold the First
Amendment value of institutional academic freedom,6 the Supreme Court in Grutter
v. Bollinger7 permitted universities facing challenges under the Equal Protection
Clause to consider race as a factor in the admissions process.8 The Court’s rationale
was based on a university’s compelling interest in diversity,9 because classroom
discussions are livelier and students are better prepared for a global workforce when
they are exposed to “widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.”10 Yet
increased attention to identity groups and their sense of inclusion, in many cases,
leads to a hyper-focus on students’ emotions and sense of identity, sometimes
resulting in the chilling of true debates in academic institutions. The result is a
diminution in the range of ideas and approaches to which students are exposed due
to fears that certain views undermine a student’s sense of identity or belonging.11
Indeed, many believe there is insufficient viewpoint diversity in academia12 and that

6.
See generally Erica Goldberg & Kelly Sarabyn, Measuring “A Degree of
Deference”: Institutional Academic Freedom in a Post-Grutter World, 51 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 217 (2011) (describing conflicts between institutional academic freedom granted to
universities and individual academic freedom rights belonging to students and professors).
7.
539 U.S. 306, 306–07 (2003).
8.
Goldberg & Sarabyn, supra note 6, at 220 (“The Supreme Court’s invocation
of academic freedom in [Grutter v. Bollinger] unambiguously declared that the courts must
give a ‘degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions, within constitutionally
prescribed limits.’”).
9.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327–28 (holding that a state law school’s “educational
judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer”
when applying strict scrutiny to the law school’s consideration of race in its admissions
process).
10.
Id. at 328–31.
11.
For a thorough exposition of the increased solicitude to students’ sense of
affront at reasonable debates, how it has chilled speech, and some proposed solutions, see
GREG LUKIANOFF & JONATHAN HAIDT, THE CODDLING OF THE AMERICAN MIND: HOW GOOD
INTENTIONS AND BAD IDEAS ARE SETTING UP A GENERATION FOR FAILURE (2018).
12.
See, e.g., Jonathan Haidt, Viewpoint Diversity in the Academy (2017),
https://jonathanhaidt.com/viewpoint-diversity/ [https://perma.cc/Y47J-U3FJ] (last visited
Feb. 26, 2022) (illustrating graphically that, since the 1990s, the academy “transformed from
an institution that leans to the left, which is not a big problem, into an institution that now has
very little political diversity, which can be a big problem in some disciplines”); see also
Christopher Frelman, In Defense of Viewpoint Diversity, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 8, 2018),
https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2018/10/08/why-its-vital-academe-have-moreviewpoint-diversity-opinion [https://perma.cc/Z8S5-W847].
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universities are imposing ideologies on students, sometimes in the name of social
justice or diversity-and-inclusion goals.13
Ultimately, the scheme that we have devised to administer our First
Amendment protections often undercuts itself. The First Amendment gives people
and institutions enough “breathing room”14 to undermine productive discourse.
Protecting speech that is rational and deliberative leads to increases in hostile,
uncivil, and sometimes distorted speech.15 Protecting speech that is genuinely truthseeking or truth-oriented leads to increases in lies and distrust.16 Protecting speech
as separate from conduct leads to violence. Safeguarding speech leads to the
weaponization of speech as a form of speech control.17
The relationship between reason and emotion, both in First Amendment
doctrine and in human psychology, fosters these incongruities that chill important
speech and increase the amount of deceptive, unproductive speech in the
marketplace of ideas. Legally, drawing lines between rational and emotional speech
is difficult and unwise, so courts protect it all, sometimes leading to emotionally
driven, cognitively biased, uncivil, unproductive discourse.18 Conversely, under the
guise of the First Amendment value of academic freedom, actors within the academy
may seek censorship of ideas that they deem emotionally harmful.
The speech pathologies created by First Amendment contradictions
become more problematic the easier communication is.19 Social media and
democratization of speech have exacerbated these contradictions20 and added new
problems such as “troll armies,” the propagandization of news, and flooding tactics
where speech itself is used to control speech.21

13.
See, e.g., Ashley Collman, A North Korean Defector Says Going to Columbia
University Reminded Her of the Oppressive Regime, Saying She Felt Forced to “Think The
Way They Want You to Think,” YAHOO!, (June 15, 2021), https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/
north-korean-defector-says-going-130747688.html [https://perma.cc/2W5X-S9EW].
14.
The Supreme Court has articulated that the First Amendment protects false
speech in order to give those who speak the truth breathing room to express their ideas without
fear of legal reprisal. See infra Section I.B.
15.
See infra Part I.
16.
See id.
17.
See Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, 117 MICH. L. REV. 547, 549
(2018).
18.
See infra Section I.A.
19.
See Rachael L. Jones, Can You Have Too Much of a Good Thing?: The
Modern Marketplace of Ideas, 83 MO. L. REV. 971, 972 (2018) (“What was once hailed as a
place of discussion - where minority voices had a platform and all citizens were invited to sift
through the muck of bad ideas and falsities in the search for truth - is starting to resemble an
echo chamber.”).
20.
Indeed, some scholars believe that, because of expression’s “speed, low cost,
and abundance” due to technological changes, “the First Amendment faces a paradoxical
threat: left unfettered, speech in the twenty-first century may undermine critical pieces of the
democratic project itself.” See Toni M. Massaro & Helen Norton, Free Speech and
Democracy: A Primer for Twenty-First Century Reformers, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1631,
1634–35 (2021).
21.
See Wu, supra note 17, at 548.
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One hopes that, even with contradictions of these types, the levels of lies,
irrational and problematic speech, violent engagement, and the chilling of academic
discourse are presumably less significant than we would experience in a
counterfactual universe where we protect less speech and academic freedom, and
where the government has more control over what is expressed. Yet scholars and
laypeople across the spectrum, motivated by different concerns, doubt that the First
Amendment is currently serving its purposes,22 especially in an era of fake news,
increasingly hateful speech, and allegations that government actors “direct online
mobs” to retaliate against critics and opponents.23 Further, there is increased
skepticism around the concept and meaning of “truth” as an ultimate goal, reducing
the appeal of protections designed to create a more enlightened citizenry.24
In this Article, I will explore the First Amendment contradictions that
undermine the justifications for broad free speech protections and create modern
pathologies in discourse. My goal is to demonstrate how these contradictions often
arise from the interaction between emotion and reason in free speech doctrine. I
argue that, although our current free speech doctrine may not seem well-equipped
to handle modern First Amendment problems, these problems actually demonstrate
the need for classic First Amendment principles and concepts—including the
speech–conduct distinction and the breathing room around reductive or emotionallycharged speech—now more than ever. Cynicism over our First Amendment is
contributing to its pathologies. Extra-legal and cultural solutions, in addition to
signaling by the courts and government actors of the need for more peaceful, rational
discourse, are the best way to cure our pathologies in discourse and restore faith in
the marketplace of ideas.
In Part I, I will explore the relationship between emotion and reason in First
Amendment doctrine. I will discuss how and when we protect even speech that
subverts rational processes, deceives listeners, or is closely tied to violence. I will
also discuss how free speech doctrine requires assuming listeners are more
reasonable, more informed, more robust, and more rational than is descriptively
accurate. In Part II, I address the ways the courts’ treatment of emotion and reason
in free speech doctrine have corroded dialogue, and how our modern age has
exacerbated the First Amendment’s ability to undermine itself. I catalog modern
breakdowns in discourse for ease of understanding how emotion influences these
22.
Id. (arguing that the justifications for the First Amendment no longer hold
when “it is no longer speech itself that is scarce, but the attention of listeners” and when troll
armies, fake news, and other forms of speech are weaponized in order to control speech).
23.
Id. at 579.
24.
The questioning of ultimate truth in modern society happens in several ways.
Most concretely, some argue that we are experiencing a political problem where facts and
reasoning matter less than things that “feel true,” and politicians can exploit this for political
gain. See Sarah C. Haan, The Post-Truth First Amendment, 94 IND. L.J. 1351, 1352–53 (2019).
More abstractly, and perhaps more importantly, the very notion of “truth” has been
undermined by post-modernism. See Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court,
53 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 496 (2002) (describing our “highly relativist post-modern age in which
we doubt all verities, or even the concept of truth”). For the purposes of this Article, I will
consider factual truth to involve verifiable, falsifiable facts that have been demonstrated
accurate and truth of opinion to involve the search for intellectually consistent, justifiable
viewpoints based on verifiable facts and logically sound modes of reasoning.
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problems. In Part III, I examine proposed solutions to these pathologies in discourse,
including tweaks to First Amendment doctrine. I argue that, generally, contrary to
the view that the First Amendment has become “obsolete,”25 its wisdom is needed
now more than ever, and that courts, government actors, and academic institutions
all have a part to play in improving the important role of discourse in the search for
factual accuracy and opinions supported by reliable information and logically sound
modes of reasoning.

I. EMOTION AND REASON, TRUTH AND LIES, PEACE AND
VIOLENCE, SPEAKERS AND LISTENERS
Many of the contradictions within First Amendment jurisprudence arise
because of a complicated interplay between emotion and reason, both in the doctrine
and in human psychology. This Part first explores how and why we protect speech
primarily designed to appeal to emotions or inspire emotional responses when a
major justification for strong free speech protections is to promote deliberative
reasoning processes that best lead to wisdom and insight. This Part then discusses
how much the doctrine protects untruthful speech and speech that is often closely
tied to violence, despite the rationale that strong free speech protections safeguard
the truth-oriented processes within the bounds of peaceful resolutions of conflicts.
Finally, this Part explains why we treat listeners of speech as reasonable, somewhat
sophisticated, and mentally robust despite these characterizations often being
descriptively untrue.
A. Rational Deliberation and Its Emotional Undermining
Perhaps the primary justification for strong, robust, principled free speech
protection is the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor, which Justice Oliver Wendall
Holmes first introduced in a dissent in Abrams v. United States,26 and which later
became a guidepost in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment doctrine.27 Under this
theory, the best way to achieve truth is through exposure to all available information
and the use of logical, deliberative processes to rationally convince people that your
ideas or views have merit.28 Scholars have noted that Supreme Court opinions
interpreting the First Amendment often evince a preference for reason over emotion
25.
See generally Wu, supra note 17, at 548 (contending that “there is reason to
fear [the First Amendment] is entering a new period of political irrelevance”).
26.
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen men have realized
that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they
believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out.”).
27.
See David S. Han, Constitutional Rights and Technological Change, 54 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 71, 96 (2020) (“As a historical matter, the modern era
of First Amendment jurisprudence began in the early twentieth century with a set of cases
dealing with textbook examples of political dissent, and it is these early political speech cases
that produced probably the two most influential and oft-quoted opinions in all
of First Amendment jurisprudence: Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States and
Justice Brandeis’s concurrence in Whitney v. California.”).
28.
See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
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and a faith that reason can triumph over emotion.29 Speech considered to “contain[]
no part of the exposition of ideas,”30 such as obscenity and fighting words,31 falls
into unprotected categories of speech,32 although the fighting words doctrine has
been interpreted narrowly by the Supreme Court and lower courts, and is not often
invoked to permit restrictions on speech.33
Yet the doctrine also permits speech that appeals to personal, psychological
motivations that are not necessarily truth-oriented. This enables the potentially
corrupting influences of cognitive and emotional biases, and protects speech that
elicits strong emotional responses,34 which are often influenced by the subconscious
and may produce biased thinking.35
The relationship between reason and emotion is complex. In some ways,
reason and emotion exist in tension, undermining each other and serving as separate
mental processes. Emotional responses are immediate and generally involuntary,
arising from subconscious processes out of the control of the individual moved by

29.
See, e.g., Sheldon Nahmod, The Sacred Flag and the First Amendment, 66
IND. L.J. 511, 544–45 (1991) (quoting Johnson v. Texas for the Supreme Court’s confidence
that reason is the best means of persuasion, because the Court held that “[t]he way to preserve
the flag’s special role is not to punish those who feel differently about these matters. It is to
persuade them that they are wrong”).
30.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
31.
So-called “fighting words” are “those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Id.
32.
See R. George Wright, An Emotion-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech,
34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 429, 430 (2003) (noting that “[t]he classic ‘fighting words’ case of
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire is largely about emotion” although the focus is on the emotions
of the listener, not the speaker); John M. Finnis, “Reason and Passion”: The Constitutional
Dialectic of Free Speech and Obscenity, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 222, 223–27 (1967) (supporting
the view that obscenity is unprotected, because it stimulates “the emotions or passions,” not
“the intellect or reason”).
33.
For example, in holding that defendant’s calling of an officer a “son of a bitch”
was not fighting words and this could not support an arrest for disorderly conduct, the Third
Circuit noted that “[t]he unprotected category of speech called ‘fighting words’ is an
extremely narrow one. The First Amendment on the whole offers broad protection for speech,
be it unpleasant, disputatious, or downright offensive.” Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199,
212 (3d Cir. 2003).
34.
When applying strong First Amendment protection to music, the Supreme
Court noted that, “[f]rom Plato’s discourse in the Republic to the totalitarian state in our own
times, rulers have known its capacity to appeal to the intellect and to the emotions, and have
censored musical compositions to serve the needs of the state.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989). The Court seemed not to distinguish here between appeals to
intellect and appeals to emotion as speech worthy of protection and threatening to tyranny.
See id.
35.
See Doni Gewirtzman, Our Founding Feelings: Emotion, Commitment, and
Imagination in Constitutional Culture, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 623, 648–49 (2009) (citing studies
demonstrating that “affective forces . . . can alter individuals’ perspective on the future, warp
their perception of risk, facilitate prejudice, manipulate attitudes based on mood, ignore
information, distort processes of analytic and analogical reasoning, contribute to the
prioritization of short-term benefit over long-term gain, and create bias in certain decisionmaking contexts”).
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particular expression.36 Emotional responses can be strong motivators to action that
subvert or undermine rational processes; the ability of strong emotional responses
to undermine reason and fairness is why courts review jury verdicts for “passion and
prejudice.”37
Often, emotionally charged, inflammatory speech or speech that reduces
sophisticated issues to black-and-white thinking are the best ways to motivate people
or receive engagement. This speech is generally entirely protected by the First
Amendment, although viewers may absorb this speech uncritically, often with
disastrous results. For example, anti-Semitic attacks on Jewish Americans “more
than doubled”38 after a deadly conflict between Israel and Hamas in May of 2021
that killed at least 256 Palestinians and 13 Israelis.39 The events leading up to this
tragic conflict, the narratives told about the responsibility of the Israeli and
Palestinian people, and the history, politics, changing borders, and animosity in the
region are complex,40 but several celebrities worldwide,41 including a freelance
journalist for CNN,42 posted reductive, anti-Semitic messages on social media such

36.
A comprehensive exposition of the causes of emotions and how they interact
with and influence feelings, mood, behavior, and cognition is beyond the scope of this Article.
While emotional psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy present many compelling,
competing theories of emotions, there is some consensus that at least some of our emotions
arise from subconscious processes, and that we also are affected by emotions about which we
are not even consciously aware or cannot recognize or properly interpret. See, e.g., id. at 655
(describing how “emotion is not always the unpredictable, unruly force that the dominant
view calls to mind, regardless of its visceral impact, often automatic nature, and
potentially subconscious roots”); David Robson, A New Way to Look at Emotions – and How
to Master Yours, BBC (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20171012-howemotions-can-trick-your-mind-and-body [https://perma.cc/8LEC-E6RA].
37.
See STEPHEN E. ARTHUR & ROBERT S. HUNTER, FEDERAL TRIAL HANDBOOK
CIVIL § 22:12 (2021–22 ed.) (showing example jury instructions to illustrate the principle that
“[a] jury verdict must be based on a rational and studied consideration of the trial evidence
and applicable law, and not on an irrational sense of sympathy, passion or prejudice”).
38.
Emily Shapiro, Antisemitism Surged Across US During Gaza Conflict, Part of
Multi-Year Rise: Advocates, ABCNews (June 10, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/
US/antisemitism-surged-us-gaza-conflict-part-multi-year/story?id=78092408 [https://perma.
cc/P2V2-BUZL] (citing data by the Anti-Defamation League).
39.
For accounts of the total number of fatalities, see Palestinian Teenager Shot
Dead in Clash at Protest, BBC NEWS (June 11, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/worldmiddle-east-57446157 [https://perma.cc/5MPV-JFDE]; 73-Year-Old Israeli Woman Who
Fell in Rocket Shelter Dies of Injuries, TIMES ISRAEL (May 23, 2021, 7:35 PM), https://www.
timesofisrael.com/73-year-old-israeli-woman-who-fell-in-rocket-shelter-dies-of-injuries/
[https://perma.cc/A5KM-GGHS].
40.
See, e.g., Israel-Gaza Violence: The Conflict Explained, BBC NEWS (June 16,
2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-44124396 [https://perma.cc/MX2S-GMHW].
41.
Marissa Sarnoff, Bollywood Actress Deletes Anti-Semitic, Pro-Genocide
Tweet Wrongly Attributing Adolf Hitler, MEDIAITE (May 12, 2021, 3:58 PM), https://www.
mediaite.com/news/bollywood-actress-deletes-anti-semitic-pro-genocide-tweet-wronglyattributing-adolf-hitler/ [https://perma.cc/4VZL-7HBT].
42.
Thomas Moore, CNN Fires Freelancer For Tweet Saying ‘World Today Needs
a Hitler,’ HILL (May 17, 2021, 9:28 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/media/553840-cnnfires-freelancer-for-tweet-saying-world-today-needs-a-hitler.

2022]

FIRST AMENDMENT CONTRADICTIONS

315

as “[t]he world today needs a Hitler.”43 The CNN journalist was fired44 and many of
the tweets were removed. A viral tweet of a quote falsely attributed to Adolph Hitler,
“I would have killed all the Jews of the world . . . but I kept some to show why I
killed them,” is likely protected speech under the First Amendment even if Twitter
can decide to remove it.45 Emotional, reductive speech abounds during any increased
conflict between Israel and Palestine, impoverishing the debate.
However, emotion and reason also relate to each other symbiotically.
Emotional responses can cause a person to reflect more deeply about a topic, change
a person’s value system, or finally motivate a person to act after rational deliberation
about his or her sense of justice or fairness.46 Without emotions, objective reasoning
processes would have far less direction.47 Many philosophers, neuroscientists, and
feminist scholars believe that emotions have a cognitive component, playing a
perceptual role; feminist philosophers, for example, frame emotions like love and
anger as the cognitive equipment to detect injustice.48 Further, often the goal of
communication is simply to induce emotional responses, to make people feel and
feel connected to our common humanity.49
As a result, in addition to protecting opinions, ideas, and many factual
assertions well-suited to the search for truth, free speech doctrine protects expression
that may be designed primarily to affect emotions without linguistic processes, such

43.
Id.
44.
Id.
45.
Lies that do not cause concrete, material harm (such as to an economic or
reputational interest) are protected speech, and hateful speech is often protected in order to
avoid governmental viewpoint discrimination.
46.
Indeed, some emotions researchers believe that moral judgments are driven by
emotional and intuitive reactions. See generally Gerald L. Clore, Psychology and the
Rationality of Emotion, 27(2) MOD. THEOLOGY 325 (2011) (citing studies).
47.
See Gewirtzman, supra note 35, at 654–55 (exploring studies demonstrating
that emotions “play a role in creating consistent and stable preferences within individuals”).
According to the philosopher David Hume, “[r]eason is, and ought only to be the slave of the
passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.” DAVID
HUME, On the Influencing Motives of the Will, in A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 3,
https://www.pitt.edu/~mthompso/readings/hume.influencing.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7V3SHKX].
48.
See, e.g., Susan Bandes, What’s Love Got to Do With It?, 8 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 97, 97–100 (2001) (describing how emotions like love and compassion are
missing from discussions of law and can better inform our notions of justice); Dan M. Kahan
& Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 269, 277–78 (1996) (eschewing the “mechanistic view” that “emotions are forces more
or less devoid of thought or perception—that they are impulses or surges that lead the person
to action without embodying beliefs, or any way of seeing the world that can be assessed as
correct or incorrect, appropriate or inappropriate” in favor of the “evaluative view [that] holds,
by contrast, that emotions do embody beliefs and ways of seeing, which include appraisals or
evaluations of the importance or significance of objects and events”).
49.
See, e.g., Hichem Naar, Art and Emotion, INTERNET ENCYC. OF PHIL.,
https://iep.utm.edu/art-emot/ [https://perma.cc/KH3K-UFEE] (last visited April 14, 2022)
(“That emotion is a central part of our dealings with artworks seems undeniable.”).
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as visual art,50 classical music,51 and dance.52 Perhaps these means of expression
move us in ways that lead to truths even deeper than we can articulate. Or perhaps
courts cannot draw a distinction between expression that is “rational” and expression
that is “emotional.” Take, as an example, Picasso’s powerful Guernica, an abstract
oil painting that most interpret as anti-war.53 The painting moves the viewer through
its use of color, form, and imagery. If the painting influences viewers, it is difficult
to determine whether an individual viewer has been provoked by emotional
processes that never lead to deeper reasoning or whether the viewer has been
stimulated to feel emotions that provoke further analysis and add richness and value
to ruminations about war.
Beyond simply protecting speech that has a predominantly emotional
component, courts sometimes protect speech that may even subvert rational
processes. Although courts generally hold that subliminal speech is not protected,54
the lawsuits by families of children who have committed suicide after listening to
music often do not withstand First Amendment challenges, even when plaintiffs
claim the music contains coded messages.55 According to one court, “art may evoke
a mood of depression as it figuratively depicts the darker side of human nature” and
may even philosophically advocate for suicide as a solution to one’s problems,
50.
See Piarowski v. Ill. Cmty. Coll. Dist. 515, 759 F.2d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 1985)
(holding that depictions of sexual imagery on stained-glass windows that did not involve a
political statement but “were art for art’s sake” were protected speech, because the “First
Amendment has been interpreted to embrace purely artistic as well as political expression and
entertainment that falls far short of anyone’s idea of ‘art,’ such as . . . topless dancing”).
51.
Indeed, discriminating against certain types of music when enacting an
otherwise permissible content-neutral regulation of volume of music would be
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. See DA Mortg., Inc. v. City of Miami Beach,
486 F.3d 1254, 1266 (11th Cir. 2007) (upholding town ordinance regulating volume that
“does not distinguish, for example, between excessively loud singing, thunderous classical
music recordings, reverberating bass beats, or television broadcasts of raucous World Cup
soccer finals”).
52.
See Willis v. Town of Marshall, 426 F.3d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding
that “most forms of dance, whether ballet or striptease, when performed for the benefit of an
audience, are considered expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment”).
53.
See Paloma Esteban Leal, Guernica, MUSEUM NACIONAL CENTRO DE ARTE
REINA SOPHIA, https://www.museoreinasofia.es/en/tr6collection/artwork/guernica [https://
perma.cc/MS54-JQ3T].
54.
See, e.g., Waller v. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. 1144, 1148 (M.D. Ga. 1991)
(“[T]he presence of a subliminal message, whose surreptitious nature makes it more akin to
false and misleading commercial speech and other forms of speech extremely limited in their
social value, would relegate the music containing such to a class worthy of little, if
any, first amendment constitutional protection.”). In Vance v. Judas Priest, a state-court
judge held that subliminal messages in music recordings are not protected speech, because
“(A) subliminal communication does not advance any of the purposes of free speech; (B) an
individual has a First Amendment right to be free from unwanted speech; and (C) the
listener’s right of privacy outweighs the speaker’s right of free speech
when subliminal speech is used.” Vance v. Judas Priest, Nos. 86-5844, 86-3939, 1990 WL
130920, at *23 (Dist. Ct. Nev. Aug. 24, 1990).
55.
See, e.g., McCollum v. CBS Inc., 202 Cal. App. 3d 989, 1000–04 (Ca. Ct. App.
1988) (dismissing lawsuit brought by parents of teen who died by suicide after listening to
Ozzy Osbourne’s song “Suicide Solution”).
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without falling into an unprotected category of incitement.56 It is unwise, in the
context of artistic or political expression, for courts to determine when speech is
profound and beneficial and when it has degraded our higher rational faculties. The
Court in Cohen v. California famously articulated, in protecting the words “Fuck
the Draft” emblazoned on a jacket worn in a courthouse, that “one man’s vulgarity
is another’s lyric.”57 Writing for the majority, Justice Harlan observed that “much
linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only
ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible
emotions as well.”58
Of course, there is a difference between communicating that the speaker
feels an emotion and appealing to an emotional (i.e., not rational) response.59 Some
scholars have argued that only speech that actually communicates an emotion,
working through cognitive processes of the listener, should be protected, but not
speech that simply is designed to elicit strong emotional responses that subvert
rational discourse.60 Courts may not easily distinguish between speech that
communicates an emotion and speech that simply arouses emotion, however.61
Emotional or primarily non-rational speech is protected, however, for
reasons other than that it may lead to truths, or because it is necessary to protect
rational speech. In addition to this “marketplace of ideas” rationale, another major
justification for free speech protections, especially in the scholarly literature, is the
view that individuals need to exercise expressive autonomy for human flourishing.62
Under this approach, individuals deserve, as a right of autonomous moral agents, to
be able to express themselves and self-actualize free from governmental
interference; this self-expression is considered necessary for their growth,
development, and fulfillment.63 An expressive autonomy rationale would likely
56.
Id. at 1001.
57.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (“Indeed we think it is largely
because governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that the
Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual.”).
58.
Id. at 26.
59.
Wright, supra note 32, at 476–77.
60.
See id.
61.
Id. at 442 (noting, in the context of courts’ protecting nude dancing as
expressive conduct, that “[e]roticism seems to involve both emotion and idea, if we assume
that idea and emotion can be kept distinct. Courts generally provide no clear understanding
of any relationship or distinction between emotion and idea in this context”).
62.
See, e.g., Erica Goldberg, Competing Free Speech Values in an Age of Protest,
39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2163, 2164 n.1 (“The primary rationales for the First Amendment are
(1) the marketplace of ideas rationale, or the idea that competing voices freely expressed
fosters the search for truth; (2) the democratic self-governance rationale, the view that free
speech is essential to allowing an informed citizenry to participate in self-government; and
(3) the expressive autonomy rationale, which deems free speech a moral right, which is
necessary for self-actualization of autonomous agents.”); R. George Wright, Why Free
Speech Cases Are as Hard (and as Easy) as They Are, 68 TENN. L. REV. 335, 337–41 (2001)
(describing the “vital contribution of free speech to self-realization”).
63.
See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 602
(1982) (describing the one true First Amendment value as “the value of having individuals
control their own destinies”).
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protect not only speech that informs, but also speech that perhaps undermines the
marketplace of ideas and threatens productive discourse.64
Perhaps as a corollary to the necessity that courts protect speech that
stimulates emotional, nonrational processes, First Amendment doctrine often
precludes remedying the emotional harm caused by speech.65 Individuals are often
expected to bear the emotional costs of speech, particularly speech on a matter of
public concern.66 This may be because courts prioritize advancing rational thought
over protecting listeners’ emotions, because, as the expression goes, “truth hurts.”67
This diminishing of the costs of emotional harm bolsters and fulfills the marketplace
of ideas rationale. But perhaps courts are also aware that the point of speech is to
inspire the full range of emotional experiences and that emotion and rationality,
while distinct concepts and processes, are inextricably intertwined.
Indeed, although discourse likely thrives on civil interchanges, the First
Amendment cannot police the incivility and hostility that ensues under its
protection. In many cases, even if it may be unproductive to dispassionate and
thoughtful discourse,68 anger might indeed be a reasonable response to certain ideas,
and anger can demonstrate just how fallacious those ideas are.69 Although anger may
corrupt the thinking process,70 and civility should likely be encouraged as a means
of productive exchanges of ideas, the tone and substance of speech are likely
64.
See infra Section II.A (discussing the emotional bonding/social cohesion
function of “fake news”).
65.
See generally Goldberg, Emotional Duties, supra note 5 (discussing the
physical/emotional harm in tort law and exploring why physical harm occasions legal
remedies when emotional harm often is not compensable).
66.
See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460–61 (2011) (“Speech is powerful. It
can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—
inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker.
As a Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public
issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.”). In Snyder, the Supreme Court, in an
8–1 decision, overturned an $11 million jury verdict awarded to a father whose son’s military
funeral attracted protesters from the Westboro Baptist Church. Id. at 447, 461.
67.
The concept that “Truth Hurts” has been recently popularized in a song by
Lizzo. See LIZZO, TRUTH HURTS (Nice Life Recording Co. & Atl. Recs. 2017).
68.
See Paul M. Litvak et al., Fuel in the Fire: How Anger Affects Judgment and
Decision-Making, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF ANGER: CONSTITUENT AND
CONCOMITANT BIOLOGICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND SOCIAL PROCESSES 287, 288 (Michael
Potegal et al., eds. 2010) (“Anger makes people indiscriminately punitive, indiscriminately
optimistic about their own chances of success, careless in their thought, and eager to take
action.”) (internal citations omitted). But see Wesley G. Moons & Diane M. Mackey,
Thinking Straight While Seeing Red: The Influence of Anger on Information Processing, 33(5)
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 706 (2007) (finding that because angry people rely on
heuristic cues, anger can sometimes stimulate better reasoning and decision-making, because
angry people may filter out irrelevant information and be inspired to engage in processing).
69.
For example, anger may reflect a subconscious understanding that a thought
process is illogical or unfair or that a given understanding of the world leads to injustice.
70.
See Olga Khazan, The Best Headspace for Making Decisions, ATLANTIC (Sept.
19, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/09/the-best-headspace-formaking-decisions/500423/ [https://perma.cc/KG2E-TLT7] (citing studies demonstrating that
“[a]nger simplifies our thinking. People switch to rules of thumb”).
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inseparable and civility cannot be enforced as a legal norm. Accounts of what even
constitutes “rational deliberation” vary widely,71 although surely we as a society
should be able to agree on ways of verifying facts and modes of reasoning that are
and are not conducive to the search for truth.
B. Breathing Room for Lies and Violence
In addition to arousing strong emotional responses that may corrupt
rational deliberation, speech may mislead, intentionally or unintentionally, and skew
one’s search for truth and resulting behavior. The lawyer for the most
“recognizable”72 defendant charged after the January 6, 2021 attacks on the United
States Capitol Building argued that his client, Jacob Anthony Chansley, was simply
following the urging of then-President Trump to “walk down Pennsylvania Avenue
and go to the Capitol.”73 President Trump declared himself the rightful winner of
the 2020 presidential election, and several people arrested for breaching the Capitol
claimed they had, as one defendant told a reporter, “answered the call of my
president.”74 The district court judge, Royce Lamberth, rejected that argument and
denied pretrial release to Chansley, noting that “if defendant truly believes that the
only reason he participated in an assault on the U.S. Capitol was to comply with
President Trump’s orders, this shows defendant’s inability (or refusal) to exercise
his independent judgment and conform his behavior to the law.”75 President Trump
has been accused of inciting others to violence,76 but his speech must meet a high
bar before it becomes actionable as incitement due to the First Amendment

71.
Part of the problem here may be modernism’s questioning of whether such a
thing as objective truth exists, and as a corollary whether the processes that lead to truth are
as rational as we believe. See, e.g., Jennifer Lynn Orff, Note & Comment, Demanding Justice
Without Truth: The Difficulty of Postmodern Feminist Legal Theory, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1197, 1197 (1995) (“Postmodern philosophy has challenged our traditional conceptions of
both rational knowledge and objective truth. Feminist theory has contributed to the attack on
rationality and objectivity by arguing that the traditional objective viewpoint has all too often
disguised a viewpoint that is actually exclusively male.”).
72.
Chansley is known as the “QAnon Shaman,” in part due to his face paint and
horned, furred headpiece. See Katie Shepherd, ‘QAnon Shaman’ Stays in Jail as Judge Slams
His Arguments: ‘So Frivolous as to Insult the Court’s Intelligence,’ WASH. POST (Mar. 9,
2021, 8:53 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/03/09/qanon-shaman-jacobchansley-jail/ [https://perma.cc/M5R6-9UMJ].
73.
See United States v. Chansley, 525 F. Supp. 3d 151, 165 (D.D.C. 2021).
74.
Alan Feuer & Nicole Hong, ‘I Answered the Call of My President’: Rioters
Say Trump Urged Them On, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/
17/nyregion/protesters-blaming-trump-pardon.html [https://perma.cc/Q6BY-ZKWT].
75.
Chansley, 525 F. Supp. 3d at 165.
76.
Sarah N. Lynch & Karen Freifield, Trump, Guilliani Accused in Lawsuit of
Conspiring to Incite Capitol Riot, REUTERS (Feb. 16, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-usa-trump-lawsuit/trump-giuliani-accused-in-lawsuit-of-conspiring-to-incite-capitol-riotidUSKBN2AG1WD [https://perma.cc/BGQ9-SWLG].
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presumption77 that those who hear his speech are a reasonable and sophisticated
audience.78
When judges, scholars, or laypeople argue for changes in First Amendment
doctrine, they often seek to more effectively restrict lies,79 lower the difficulty
required to render speech unprotected as incitement,80 or create a new category of
unprotected speech for hateful speech.81 Speech that distorts or deceives, speech that
leads others to lawless action, and speech that demonizes individuals based on their
identities often comes at great social cost with little social value, yet the United
States uniquely protects this speech quite broadly in its First Amendment
jurisprudence.82 If the primary goal of the First Amendment is to achieve truth, it is
a wonder that listeners are exposed to so many lies, so much incendiary speech, and
so much demonization based on group-identity characteristics. Indeed, some feel
that speech itself has lost its value due to so much poisonous, harmful, deceptive
speech, or never had much value in the first place.83
The reason for the contradictions First Amendment jurisprudence has
created in this area can best be described using the “breathing space” analogy from
the First Amendment’s interaction with libel law.84 If lawsuits were free and courts
and juries could perfectly determine which speech was a lie, far less defamatory
speech would merit protection under the First Amendment. Lies that caused no
77.
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (“[T]he constitutional
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy
of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”).
78.
See infra Section I.C.
79.
Noah Feldman, Supreme Court May Change Libel-Law Standard Involving
Public Figures, OMAHA WORLD HERALD (July 13, 2021), https://omaha.com/opinion/
columnists/noah-feldman-supreme-court-may-change-libel-law-standard-involving-publicfigures/article_89fa2dfe-e018-11eb-8458-170e0979a226.html
[https://perma.cc/6K4KCHWZ].
80.
See, e.g., Clay Calvert, First Amendment Envelope Pushers: Revisiting the
Incitement-to-Violence Test with Messrs. Brandenburg, Trump & Spencer, 51 CONN. L. REV.
117 (2019).
81.
“Hate speech” as a category of unprotected speech does not exist in the United
States; however, many scholars contend that hate speech has few if any social benefits and
tremendous social costs, and should therefore be regulated. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron,
Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1596 passim (2010);
MARI MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH,
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT passim (1993); Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort
Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 133,
143–45 (1982).
82.
See generally Roger P. Alford, Free Speech and the Case for Constitutional
Exceptionalism, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1071 (2008).
83.
See Brian Leiter, The Case Against Free Speech, 38 SYDNEY L. REV. 407, 408
(2016) (“All things considered, much, perhaps most, speech, in fact, has little or no positive
value. So the idea that its free expression is prima facie a good thing should be rejected.”).
84.
See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964) (holding that
“erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms
of expression are to have the breathing space that they need to survive”) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).
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material harm would likely still be protected,85 but courts could protect individuals’
reputations more and, in so doing, elevate the speech entering the marketplace of
ideas by filtering out defamatory lies. A jurisprudence of this nature might render
speech more trustworthy, thus facilitating a more efficient operation of the
marketplace of ideas. However, because individuals fear the expense of lawsuits and
are risk averse, the Supreme Court has expressed concern that individuals will selfcensor.86 Someone who is 95% sure that a statement about an important public
figure—say that she accepts bribes—is true might censor himself for fear of either
that 5% uncertainty, that juries will misunderstand the facts or misapply the law, or
of the expenses of even a winning lawsuit.
To ensure that important expression is not chilled through self-censorship,
courts place “breathing space” around the restriction of all defamatory speech—
even false speech—so that truthful speech has a buffer before a lawsuit can survive
summary judgment. If a public figure sues for defamation, that public figure plaintiff
can win only if the statements made against her are both false and made with actual
malice, which is intentional falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.87 If a private
figure sues for defamation, the false statement must be uttered or written by someone
who was at least negligent with respect to the truth.88 Strict liability cannot attach to
defamation lawsuits.89 This ensures that far more ideas, both truth and false, will
enter the marketplace of ideas, especially about public figures.
Just as libel lawsuits are notoriously difficult to win in the United States,
the bar for speech that is unprotected as incitement is very high in America. This
creates another contradiction. One of the justifications for broad free speech
protections is that speech does not cause tangible, permanent harm the way conduct
does.90 The speech–conduct distinction in free speech doctrine centers around the
idea that speech is special and is protected separately from conduct, even conduct
inspired by speech. Speech can be deliberated upon, unless it purposely circumvents
the deliberative process and causes violence before people can think dispassionately.
Incitement is unprotected as a category of speech, but speech must be directed to
and reasonably likely to cause imminent lawless action before it can be deemed
incitement.91 This high bar ensures breathing room around valuable political
statements that might be misused by others and inspire unlawful responses. Unlike
in the libel context, there is no verifiable way to determine whether something is
incitement or not (true statements can be falsified in the libel context, giving the
speaker some measure of certainty and assurance before speaking). Those concerned
that their statements may accidentally incite others to violence and that they may
therefore be punished need even more breathing room or they will self-censor. As a
result, not only lies but also speech that comes close to rousing an unruly mob (and
85.
See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 722–24 (2012) (holding that false
statements are not an unprotected category of speech, and, to criminalize a lie, it must be
connected to fraud, reputational interests, or a specific, concrete harm).
86.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 278–79.
87.
Id. at 279–80.
88.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347–49 (1974).
89.
Id. at 347–48.
90.
See Sullivan, supra note 5, at 977, 982.
91.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969).
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may indeed do so) is protected, all in the name of ensuring that courts do not chill
valuable expression. The quest for truth and civilized discourse instead of violent
resolution of conflict has, especially in our fast-paced modern era of discourse, led
to much violence and distortion.92 And hate.
Hateful speech is protected due to a fear of the government censoring
speech based on its viewpoint.93 Hateful speech, many have argued, not only leads
to violence, oppression, and even genocide but also is not rational or beneficial to
any exposition of ideas.94 Hateful speech rouses anger, simplifies debates, and of all
the types of expression is among the least valuable, most toxic, and least conducive
to productive discussion. And yet courts fear the government deciding which speech
illuminates and which does not.95 Legitimate political opinions, especially on
sensitive, delicate topics, need breathing room or people will self-censor for fear of
communicating “hate speech.” Further, the speech itself is not violent, so we allow
individuals their expressive freedoms to opine in ways that they believe are
beneficial to the search for truth. Countries that do regulate “hate speech” have done
so in contexts where restricting speech would be unthinkable in the United States—
for example, Holocaust denial,96 and jokes by a comedian that were deemed
incitement to terrorism.97 We live with the value, and we suffer the cost—sometimes
an angry, hateful, violent population.
Part of the reason that libel, incitement, and inflammatory speech require
this type of breathing room is because, given the discretion involved in
implementing these standards, juries may be motivated to determine that speech is
libel or incitement based not on whether the speech is actually true or false, or
actually incitement or not, but on whether they find the speech agreeable or
disagreeable. In that case, the juries themselves will be discriminating on the basis
of viewpoint. The juries, using the mechanism of the state, will then be committing
one of the chief First Amendment evils when rendering decisions about First
Amendment cases. This ability of a jury to commit actual constitutional violations
renders First Amendment cases different than, say, Fourth Amendment cases or
medical malpractice cases, where the jury itself cannot violate someone’s privacy in
rendering a Fourth Amendment verdict. The jury’s own cognitive biases in

92.
See infra Part II.
93.
See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460–61 (2011) (holding that even
vile, hateful speech is protected, especially on a matter of public concern, when the distress
occasioned by the speech is based on its content or viewpoint).
94.
E.g., Waldron, supra note 81, at 1642; MATSUDA, supra note 81.
95.
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391–92 (1992) (striking down
city ordinance that prohibits fighting words that are specifically “bias-motivated” or “based
on virulent notions of racial supremacy”).
96.
See Dan Glaun, Germany’s Laws on Hate Speech, Nazi Propaganda &
Holocaust Denial: An Explainer, PBS (July 12, 2021), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/
article/germanys-laws-antisemitic-hate-speech-nazi-propaganda-holocaust-denial/ [https://
perma.cc/TV9U-JNRB].
97.
See Krishnadev Calamur, Controversial French Comedian Arrested Over
Facebook Post on Paris Attacks, NPR (Jan. 14, 2015, 11:46 AM), https://www.npr.org/
sections/thetwo-way/2015/01/14/377201227/controversial-french-comedian-arrested-overfacebook-post-on-paris-attacks [https://perma.cc/6TAH-4HDZ].
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rendering First Amendment decisions are partially why this breathing room is so
necessary.98
C. Assumptions about Listeners to Protect Speakers
As described in the previous Section, inhabitants of the United States are
exposed to provocative, deceptive, inflammatory, hateful speech, and this exposure
has increased since the advent of the Internet and social media platforms. In order
to protect speakers’ ability to engage in a range of expression, and, to some degree,
in order to protect listeners’ ability to access information, courts generally assume
listeners have a high tolerance for upsetting speech, are reasonably sophisticated,
and can reasonably discern hyperbole from reality.
Consider the results of Karen McDougal’s lawsuit against Tucker Carlson,
the host of the Fox News program “Tucker Carlson Tonight.”99 The former model
and actress sued Fox News when Carlson allegedly “accused her of extorting nowPresident Donald J. Trump out of approximately $150,000 in exchange for her
silence about an alleged affair between Ms. McDougal and President Trump.”100
The district court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to state a claim, holding that,
within the context of political debates on “commentary talk shows,” audiences
understand that speakers engage in hyperbole, especially when they accuse people
of committing crimes.101 This audience understanding applies doubly to shows like
“Tucker Carlson Tonight,” because part of Tucker Carlson’s project is to “challenge
political correctness and media bias . . . . This general tenor of the show should then
inform a viewer that he is not stating actual facts about the topics he discusses and
is instead engaging in exaggeration and non-literal commentary.”102 Carlson also
prefaced his account of McDougal’s relationship with President Trump by
disclaiming that his analysis depends on the veracity of the individual who accused
McDougal of threatening President Trump, Michael Cohen, and “assuming honesty
isn’t usually a wise idea with Michael Cohen.”103
This analysis seems sound because Tucker Carlson informed his audience
that his premises about McDougal may not be true, and Carlson often engages in
hyperbole for rhetorical effect. What may be descriptively inaccurate, however, is
to assume that Carlson’s audience both listened carefully to his disclaimers in this
instance and does not take him literally in general. McDougal’s lawsuit was defeated
due to the “rational audience model” that generally governs defamation law.
The rational audience model, according to Professor Lyrissa Lidsky,
reflects “an idealized vision of the audience of core speech” where “audiences are
capable of rationally assessing the truth, quality, and credibility of core speech.”104
Developments in cognitive psychology, unfortunately, indicate that this “faith in
98.
See infra Part II.
99.
See generally McDougal v. Fox News Network, 489 F. Supp. 3d 174
(S.D.N.Y. 2020).
100.
Id. at 177.
101.
Id. at 182–83.
102.
Id. at 183–84.
103.
Id. at 184.
104.
Lyrissa Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment
Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 801 (2010).
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human reason is misplaced,” and with it, the ideal of the marketplace of ideas.105
Human beings, when mentally taxed, engage in heuristics, or “mental shortcuts,” to
guide their decision-making. These shortcuts often deviate from rationality.106 As
examples, humans change their views on a subject depending on how the subject is
framed (the framing effect);107 filter information such that they are most affected by
evidence they have heard most and most recently (the availability heuristic);108 and
become stymied when presented with too much information (decision paralysis).109
The assumption that audiences rationally process speech, setting aside the variation
in education level and level of discernment, flies in the face of cognitive psychology
that applies to everyone and sometimes affects the most intelligent audiences the
worst.110
Yet First Amendment doctrine persists in its normative “reasonable
audience” approach despite descriptive evidence to the contrary. Professor Lidsky
compellingly articulates why: the First Amendment’s assumptions about the
media’s role in fostering critical engagement are the same assumptions that underlie
our democracy and constitutional regime—that the public is capable of democratic
self-governance and forging consensus on important political issues.111 The
normative ideal of the rational audience prevents “authoritative selection of the
information to be included in public discourse,” which would violate citizen
autonomy, denying citizens “a fundamental aspect of citizenship.”112 The rational
audience model is anti-paternalistic,113 and it further prevents reduction of “public
discourse to the level of the least sophisticated audience.”114
Lidsky compares the rational audience model to the reasonable person in
tort law. “[T]he reasonable audience model in First Amendment law performs a
function analogous to the reasonable person in tort law. It sets a minimum standard
of reasonableness to which all citizens are expected to conform regardless (for the
most part) of their actual capacity to do so.”115 When defendants fail to conform to
the standard of a reasonable person, they suffer for this standard: their liability
increases. Yet in defamation lawsuits, when audiences behave irrationally and are
credulous with hyperbolic speech, such as Tucker Carlson’s hypothetical involving
Karen McDougal, the defamation plaintiff suffers in addition to the audience being
misled. Thus, in order to preserve the view that speech should be well-informed,
rational, and accessible to all, the interaction of libel law and the First Amendment

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 828.
Id. at 829–30.
Id. at 830.
Id. at 831–32.
Id. at 832.
See David Robson, Why Smart People Are More Likely To Believe Fake News,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 1, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/apr/01/whysmart-people-are-more-likely-to-believe-fake-news [https://perma.cc/GXP7-3SPS].
111.
Lidsky, supra note 104, at 839–40.
112.
Id. at 840.
113.
Id. at 844.
114.
Id. at 841–43.
115.
Id. at 842.
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fosters a speech environment that allows distortions to flourish among us decidedly
irrational audience members.
Thus, First Amendment doctrine’s actual effect (the protection of
emotional, inflammatory, misleading, and hateful speech) is fundamentally
incongruous with its primary justification: the fostering of a deliberative, nonviolent,
rational search for truth.

II. INSTANCES OF FIRST AMENDMENT CONTRADICTIONS
The previous Part explored the First Amendment contradictions presented
by the relationship between rationality and emotion, both in free speech doctrine and
in human psychology. Although the First Amendment’s potentially greatest asset is
to protect the rational process that leads to truth, much irrational speech is
encompassed within the First Amendment’s protection. The First Amendment
cannot police certain types of emotionally charged speech that have the potential to
corrode our rational faculties, mislead us, and stir some individuals or groups to
lawless acts. Humans are emotional creatures, and First Amendment jurisprudence
cannot account for—and if anything exacerbates—pathologies in discourse that take
us away from truth. When humans place our (sometimes unconscious) emotional
responses and our emotional needs above the search for truth in unreasonable ways,
we create pathologies that have increased as the ease with which we communicate
and voice our opinions to large audiences has increased.
Strong, robust First Amendment protections with breathing room created
for lies, incitement, and reductive speech that appeals to emotions and subverts
rational processes have facilitated pathologies in our discourse that cannot be
corrected legally. In this Part, I catalogue particular breakdowns in discourse and
how they are caused by the combination of robust free speech doctrine, the
unreasonable prioritization of emotions above the search for truth, and the everincreasing ease of communication. These pathologies infecting the marketplace of
ideas arise across the political spectrum. Section A details the proliferation of socalled “fake news” and, as a lesser version of outright lies, oversimplified narratives
that spread and grip people’s imaginations in response to current events. These
distortions of truth arise due to the emotional balm of reaffirming one’s own
narrative, cognitive biases, and our desire to create cohesive social groups—and our
sense of clannishness. Section B discusses how this need for belonging and
validation manifests in a desire to feel included based on one’s identity, and how
discourse around identity has, in combination with mass mobilization of social
media and academic culture, chilled speech that might add nuance to issues relating
to identity groups as they have been defined.
These different types of pathologies in discourse—problems of speech
quality and problems of speaker identity—may not be of the same magnitude;
however, they likely reinforce each other, continuing a vicious cycle of polarization
and toxic breakdowns of discourse and rational deliberation. Additionally,
depending on where one sits on the political spectrum, some of these problems may
appear to be greater in magnitude than others, so the very same biases described in
these Sections may contribute to how one views the significance of the different
types of pathologies in our discourse.
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A. Fake News and Simplified Narratives: Problems of Speech Quality
Many across the political spectrum believe that discourse is broken and
question whether the marketplace of ideas still operates to achieve truth.116 Wellconnected, politically engaged members of society have been accused of misleading
the public,117 and even sophisticated listeners form conclusions based on reflexive
emotions or simplified narratives without understanding complete and accurate
information.118 Some believe people do not actually engage in rational deliberation,
and now there is scientific evidence to show that “rational deliberation is based on
a view of the electoral and public policy discourse that is not descriptively
accurate.”119 Confirmation bias means we attend most to facts and arguments that
support our pre-existing worldviews.120
Although incidents of spreading false narratives to injure one’s political
opponents date back to ancient times,121 social media and Internet culture may
exacerbate these problems122 by empowering us to select information based on our

116.
See Joseph Blocher, Free Speech and Justified True Belief, 133 HARV. L. REV.
439, 440–41 (2019) (describing how the “marketplace of ideas model was ‘virtually
canonized’ for generations” but that “[m]any people seem ready to conclude that the
experiment has failed”). According to Blocher, “[d]evelopments in psychology, economics,
history, sociology, and other scholarly fields have drawn attention to the host of problems—
cognitive limitations, motivated reasoning, racism, sexism, resource inequalities, and the
like—that make it impossible for the marketplace of ideas to reliably deliver on its promise
of identifying ‘truth.’” Id. at 441.
117.
According to Alan Chen, during the 2016 presidential election, “[a]ccusations
of lying were directed at political candidates, mainstream news media, interest groups, and
other individuals and organizations posting stories meant to be understood as legitimate news
on various social media platforms.” Allen K. Chen, Free Speech, Rational Deliberation, and
Some Truths About Lies, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV. 357, 366 (2020).
118.
In our news media, “[t]he spread of inaccurate reporting encompasses topics
including voter fraud, climate change, genetically modified organism (GMO) food products,
vaccinations, and fluoride in drinking water. Most recently, fake news stories have emerged
in reporting about the COVID-19 pandemic and the Black Lives Matter movement.” Id. at
374.
119.
Id. at 395.
120.
Studies demonstrate that confirmation bias—or the tendency to over-weigh
evidence that supports a pre-existing belief—exists even when people are incentivized to be
objective, and this would be even more deleterious when people have emotional reasons to
cling to mistaken or simplified beliefs. See George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving
Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 139 (1993).
121.
See Chen, supra note 117, at 368–69 (detailing the chronology of “fake news,”
including a case where the “historian Procopius . . . in the sixth century AD reportedly wrote
false stories to damage the reputation of the Roman Emperor Justinian”).
122.
See Jeff Hermes, The Challenges for Free Speech Advocates in a Time of
Turmoil, 46 NO. 1 LITIG. 49, 53 (2019) (“When one person in a city of 100,000 speaks from
a soapbox in the park, we tend to dismiss that person as a lone voice in the wilderness; but
when 3,000 users out of 300 million on Twitter form a vocal bloc, they can have a significant
effect. The special dynamics of social media allow messages that would otherwise be weeded
out by the traditional marketplace of ideas to survive and flourish instead.”).
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cognitive biases and clannishness.123 Indeed, scientists found that false information
“diffuses significantly farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth, in all
categories of information, and in many cases by an order of magnitude.”124 Although
there is a distinction between purposely misleading the public and sharing a
simplified narrative that one believes, the corrosive effect on discourse is apparent
regardless of the intentions of speaker and listener.
Emotional bias also corrodes free speech. We enjoy creating communities
around ideas, and this emotional balm has intensified as there are newer ways to
create communities by excluding those who do not share our values, however
specified. Professor Alan Chen provocatively contends that even “fake news,”
which he defines as “the deliberate, public communication as truthful of a verifiably
false and material statement of fact regarding a matter of public concern, in which
the original source is an entity representing itself to be a legitimate journalistic
enterprise or otherwise reliable source of news stories,”125 can serve a social
cohesion function among listeners who feel a sense of belonging through sharing a
reality.126 This explains “why fake news is not only effective but also may be
valuable to its consumers without regard to objective truth.”127 Like classical music
or abstract art, fake news can communicate emotionally, create feelings of
connectedness, and allow listeners to self-actualize through the creation of
identity.128
In this environment of emotional selection of speech that reaffirms preexisting ideologies and builds communities through shared realities and
noncognitive processes, false, incomplete, or logically inconsistent information
spreads rapidly, often unchecked. Intellectual laziness and lack of time has further
inspired us to find the information that confirms our worldview and spread it to our
communities, giving people the outrage and motivation needed to either take action
or further shut down dialogue with others who might add nuance to their accounts.
Memes on complex topics that have stumped great thinkers for decades allow those
with more outrage than attention span to feel quite confident in their reductive views.
Speech is weaponized against speech—troll armies,129 bots, and those insistent on
misleading the public for their own gain can use the First Amendment’s protections
to degrade the marketplace of ideas.

123.
See Mostafa M. El-Bermawy, Your Filter Bubble Is Destroying
Democracy, WIRED (Nov. 18, 2016, 5:45 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/11/filterbubble-destroying-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/6VM9-SNHV].
124.
Peter Dizikes, Study: On Twitter, False News Travels Faster Than True
Stories, MIT NEWS (Mar. 8, 2018), https://news.mit.edu/2018/study-twitter-false-newstravels-faster-true-stories-0308 [https://perma.cc/798X-QBV7].
125.
Chen, supra note 117, at 367.
126.
Id. at 411–14.
127.
Id. at 412.
128.
Id. at 407–11.
129.
See Tim Wu, supra note 17, at 560 (“Among emerging threats are the speechcontrol techniques linked to online trolling, which seek to humiliate, harass, discourage, and
even destroy targeted speakers using personal threats, embarrassment, and ruining of their
reputations.”).
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The First Amendment’s protection of information that appeals to, I would
argue, our baser natures—our clannishness, our laziness, or simply that we lack the
time to truly understand an issue—creates problems of information quality. As
speakers compete for listeners’ limited attention and resources, they often thrive by
exploiting our emotional biases and needs. As a result, there is more information of
a low quality entering the marketplace of ideas. Compounding this, people often
filter to seek out information based on how much the information confirms their
priors and makes them feel validated, not on how accurate or sophisticated the
information is, so this lower-quality information—which is either incomplete,
sensationalized, or downright false—gets more purchase with listeners with strong
priors. This low-quality information then affects how people vote, what they believe,
how they conduct themselves, and for what causes they are willing to make
sacrifices.
B. Discourse Around Identity and Inclusion: Problems of Speaker Identity
In addition to pathologies in discourse stemming from problems of
information quality, there are problems relating to speaker identity. Our increased
sensitivity to people’s emotional well-being is chilling the speech of those who
either belong to certain identity groups or wish to speak on topics deemed related to
a listener’s identity. Members of marginalized groups, such as women and racial
minorities, have argued for some time that there is a “tax” on their speech in the
form of online trolls and Internet harassment.130 Now, members of nonmarginalized
groups may also feel chilled against speaking on certain topics that pertain to identity
groups,131 or even speaking at all, especially in academic settings.132 These two
seemingly opposing forces—marginalized speakers and nonmarginalized speakers
feeling chilled from participating in discussions—unfortunately do not cancel each
other out and equalize speech opportunities, adding pluralism to the marketplace of
ideas. Instead, this phenomenon leads to those with more extreme, ardent viewpoints
who are most passionate about a topic and least daunted by social pressures feeling
the most at liberty to voice their views. This situation presents a significant First
130.
See, e.g., Erica Goldberg, Free Speech Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV.
687, 701 (2016) (“The Internet, a medium that provides unprecedented access to speech for
those without great resources, is the locus of calls for reforms that suppress speech, especially
anonymous speech, by some feminists, who believe that misogynist reactions to blogs place
a ‘tax’ on women seeking to participate in Internet conversations.”).
131.
As examples, men often feel—or are influenced to feel—like they cannot
participate in the abortion debate, because they do not have as large a stake as women. See,
e.g., Monica Hesse, It Can Be Awkward for Men to Speak Out on Abortion Rights. But We
Need Them to Try, WASH. POST (May 22, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/
style/it-can-be-awkward-for-men-to-speak-out-on-abortion-rights-but-we-need-them-to-try/
2019/05/22/61cd84f4-7803-11e9-b7ae-390de4259661_story.html [https://perma.cc/RL53F2QK].
132.
See Daniel Craig, Penn TA Says She Calls on Black Women First; Incites
Critics, Supporters, and Nazi Trolls, PHILLY VOICE (Oct. 21, 2017), https://www.phillyvoice.
com/penn-ta-says-she-calls-black-women-first-incites-critics-supporters-and-nazi-trolls/
[https://perma.cc/7CM8-LKX3] (discussing a device called “progressive stacking,” where
one graduate student tweeted that she “will always call on my Black women students first.
Other POC get second tier priority. WW [White women] come next. And, if I have to, white
men”).
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Amendment contradiction. Our sense of identity is impeding necessary
conversations about important social issues, even though discourse is a way to selfactualize and create identity.
This pathology of the problem of speaker identity is not simply a
resurrection of fears about “political correctness” that inspired universities to enact
“speech codes” and anti-harassment policies in the 1990s.133 Senses of belonging
are important, and alienating vulnerable members of the population does not benefit
discourse. However, the combination of an unproductive hyperfixation on emotional
well-being, the view that those emotionally impacted by certain policies or practices
are best suited to speak about them (a view that turns the concept of objective,
rational discourse on its head), post-modern and critical theories that question the
very concept of truth, and strong associations between political opinions and
people’s sense of identity have engendered motivated reasoning, squashed and
corrupted entire lines of inquiry, and threaten to overwhelm the way we discuss
important topics.
Both in terms of academic and legal developments,134 and in terms of social
movements, there has been increased attention to emotional well-being in recent
years.135 This increased attention may be counterproductive, however—not simply
to the search for truth but also to our emotional growth and welfare.136 Attending
too much to emotions affects our free speech culture, especially our First
Amendment institutions—like academia—best suited to facilitating the search for
truth.137 In conjunction with, and perhaps amplified by, increased sensitivity to
emotions is increased attention to identity, identity-based issues, and fostering a
sense of inclusion. Attention to identity-based issues is often motivated by
important factors like diversity-based rationales for affirmative action,138

133.
For a nice discussion on campus speech policies, see Vince Herron, Note,
Increasing the Speech: Diversity, Campus Speech Codes, and the Pursuit of Truth, 67 S. CAL.
L. REV. 407 (1994).
134.
See generally Laura E. Little, Negotiating the Tangle of Law and Emotion,
86 CORNELL L. REV. 974, 975 (2001) (“[F]rom the academy’s vantage point, emotions and
their influence on scholarly projects are stronger than ever.”).
135.
See Anna Choi, Why Schools Should Pay More Attention to Students’ Mental
Health and Well-Being, OECD EDUC. & SKILLS TODAY (Mar. 14, 2008), https://
oecdedutoday.com/why-schools-should-pay-more-attention-to-students-mental-health-andwell-being/ [https://perma.cc/73M7-ZPEN] (“The notion of well-being and happiness has
increasingly taken centre stage in our societies over the recent years.”).
136.
LUKIANOFF & HAIDT, supra note 11, at 30 (“When children are raised in a
culture of safetyism, which teaches them to stay ‘emotionally safe’ while protecting them
from every imaginable danger, it may set up a feedback loop: kids become more fragile and
less resilient, which signals to adults that they need more protection, which makes them even
more fragile and less resilient.”).
137.
Id. at 24–29 (discussing the “concept creep” from physical safety to emotional
safety that has led to “safe spaces” and cancellations of speakers on contested topics on
college campuses).
138.
See supra Introduction.
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inclusiveness trainings, and the triumph of “critical legal studies”139 and its
successors—like critical race theory. These areas of attention raised needed
awareness on the effects of certain policies and practices on marginalized groups140
but may have rendered many (including students) hyper-fixated on distributional
effects and identity groups in divisive and counter-productive ways.141
Fixation on one’s identity as part of a group and over-attending to one’s
emotional need to feel validated as part of that group, although important to parts of
our sense of self and understanding of the world, can be damaging to analytical
reasoning. The emotional desire to form identities and reaffirm belonging in identity
groups fosters “motivated reasoning,” or “the unconscious tendency of individuals
to process information in a manner that suits some end or goal extrinsic to the
formation of accurate beliefs.”142 In one engaging in motivated reasoning, the goal
of seeking truth is superseded by some other goal or emotional desire. The desire to
form and protect one’s identity as part of a group is a particularly strong driver of
motivated reasoning, which means our desire for inclusion (admirable in many
situations) exists in tension with the marketplace-of-ideas model of truth-seeking.
Indeed, “[r]ecent research suggests that one of the primary goals of motivated
reasoning is the expression and protection of group identity—such as one’s cultural
or political identity.”143
Dan Kahan and Keith Stanovich have posited a theory of expressive
rationality where “individuals of opposing cultural identities can be expected to use
all the cognitive resources at their disposal to form identity-congruent beliefs.”144
139.
Critical legal studies is a movement designed to counter the view that the law
is a neutral, apolitical force. It also attacks liberal political theory to the extent liberalism
relies on formalism and the idea that formalities in the law and legal doctrine have inherent
meaning. See David C. Caudill, Disclosing Tilt: A Partial Defense of Critical Legal Studies
and a Comparative Introduction to the Philosophy of the Law-Idea, 72 IOWA L. REV. 287,
290–91 (1987).
140.
See id. at 291 (describing a theme of critical legal studies as “the idea that law
legitimates oppressive social orders and hides the tensions in those orders”).
141.
See Jacey Fortin, Critical Race Theory: A Brief History, N.Y. TIMES (July 27,
2021, 5:19 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/article/what-is-critical-race-theory.html [https://
perma.cc/8PTQ-66CU] (outlining the contentious debate between proponents and opponents
of teaching critical race theory in schools). Because critical race theory focuses on the effects
of United States policy on different racial groups and argues that racism is embedded in the
American experience, many of its opponents believe it is teaching children a divisive ideology
and lens with which to understand history that classifies people based on race, not simply
providing students with facts about history. See Conor Friedersdorf, Critical Race Theory Is
Making Both Parties Flip Flop, ATLANTIC (July 8, 2021) https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/
archive/2021/07/north-carolina-critical-race-theory-ban-free-speech/619381/ [https://perma.
cc/AW92-8JB5].
142.
Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term, Foreword: Neutral
Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 19 (2011).
143.
Ronnell Andersen Jones & Lisa Grow Sun, Freedom of the Press in PostTruthism America, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 419, 443 (2020).
144.
Dan M. Kahan & Keith E. Stanovich, Rationality and Belief in Human
Evolution (Annenberg Pub. Pol’y Ctr., Working Paper No. 5, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2838668 [https://perma.cc/CS6F-ERVF].
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Their study tested whether individuals better equipped with logical reasoning skills
had the disposition to re-examine their intuitions in light of available evidence.145
Instead, they found that higher cognitive reasoning “scores magnified the division
between relatively religious and relatively nonreligious study subjects.”146
Participants with higher cognitive reasoning and reflection skills were more likely
to believe in evolution if they were relatively secular; however, higher cognitive
reasoning and reflection scores did not make participants more likely to believe in
evolution if they are relatively religious.147 Thus, they concluded that people “use
their critical reasoning capacities to reinforce beliefs that effectively signal who they
are—whose side they are on—in the struggle for the cultural supremacy that public
acceptance of their position has come to connote.” In essence, our reasoning skills
in light of new evidence do not always promote the search for truth but instead serve
the stabilization of cultural identity.148
This motivated reasoning means that the more we view the world in terms
of identity and connect viewpoints with identity groups, and the more we prioritize
satisfying the emotional comfort of belonging based on identity, the more the search
for truth may be thwarted in favor of finding and preserving identity. This will not
only cause people to compromise their reasoning skills and intellectual rigor–—for
example, acknowledging only the facts that support their narrative and dismissing
facts that undermine their position—when issues touch upon their sense of identity
and the viewpoints associated with that identity. Motivated reasoning based on
securing one’s identity will also cause (and perhaps already has caused) them to
want to silence those whose identities do not align with their views or whose views
seem to undermine their sense of identity. This is happening on college campuses,
where legitimate scholars (and some illegitimate scholars) are being silenced by
crowds for being sexist, racist, or taking positions that undermine one’s identity.149
Simply debating whether America is a “rape culture” is, in the view of some
students, “damaging,” because it “could serve to invalidate people’s experiences.”150
Issues that touch upon one’s sense of identity become inflammatory and
often toxic to productive discourse. This does not mean we should not acknowledge
the roles that identity plays in creating our sense of selves, nor should we deny the
costs some members of society pay, in different contexts and throughout history,
due to their identities. Yet we have over-defined and committed too much to our
place in certain identity groups in a way that has become illiberal and contrary to
America’s free speech culture. Our discourse is dominated by membership in
particular identity groups and how particular policies or cultural practices affect
those identity groups. An over-emphasis on identity groups and the tension between
them is undermining our ability to have nuanced discussions of important social

145.
Id.
146.
Id.
147.
Id.
148.
Id.
149.
See LUKIANOFF & HAIDT, supra note 11, at 47–50 (detailing disinvitations and
disruptive protests on college campuses that escalated around 2013).
150.
Id. at 26–29.
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issues—from gender expression and identity151 to racial justice issues—without fear
of reprisal or major social consequences.152
More importantly (and abstractly), those entrenched in their views and their
connection to identity have increasingly abandoned a belief in free speech and its
commitments to viewpoint neutrality and process in order to achieve truth.153 A
process-based method of achieving truth requires buy-in from individuals that we,
as a collective, can work together to achieve truth and, importantly, requires a belief
in process-based methods as opposed to results-oriented thinking. Yet, with the rise
of identity-group thinking, many no longer believe in discussions, even academic
discussions, that occur within a sphere of the neutrality necessary to sustain rational
inquiry and the search for truth.154 Neutrality favors the oppressor, they argue, and
discussions of issues reduce to whether one is on the side of the oppressor or the
oppressed.155
The last Part of this Article will end on both an optimistic and a pessimistic
note. I will first discuss how to continue to manage the contradictions created by
reason and emotion in First Amendment doctrine. I will then address some of the
proposals other scholars have suggested for dealing with, specifically, the problem
151.
The discussion surrounding debates between certain feminists and trans
thinkers and activists often revolves around whether certain viewpoints, for example, are
“transphobic.” See Aja Romano, Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s Cancel Culture Screed Is a
Dangerous Distraction, VOX (June 18, 2021, 8:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/22537261/
chimamanda-ngozi-adichie-transphobia-cancel-culture-jk-rowling-akwaeke-emeziolutimehin-adegbeye [https://perma.cc/YK28-JYZP] (arguing, in response to “a lengthy and
eloquent takedown of cancel culture” that the more salient question is whether Chimamanda
Ngozi Adichie has transphobic views).
152.
As another example, condemning arson as an effective method of protest in
the wake of George Floyd’s murder by police officer Derek Chauvin resulted in composer
Daniel Elder being barraged with comments calling him a white supremacist and being
blacklisted as a composer. See Robby Soave, A Composer Condemned Arson. Now No One
Will Hire Him, REASON (June 15, 2021, 9:00 AM), https://reason.com/2021/06/15/danielelder-cancel-culture-choral-composer-antifa-blm-gia/ [https://perma.cc/T8GK-R3W8]. A
North Korean defector described attending Columbia University as indoctrination similar to
the North Korean regime, where expressing a penchant for reading Jane Austin novels labeled
her as “brainwashed” in a “colonialist mentality” by the books. Collman, supra note 13.
153.
See generally Erica Goldberg, First Amendment Cynicism and Redemption, 88
U. CIN. L. REV. 959 (2019).
154.
At the College of William and Mary, for example, student protesters disrupted
a speaker from the American Civil Liberties Union because “liberalism is white supremacy.”
See Robby Soave, Black Lives Matter Students Shut Down the ACLU's Campus Free Speech
Event Because 'Liberalism Is White Supremacy,’ REASON (Oct. 24, 2017) https://reason.com/
2017/10/04/black-lives-matter-students-shut-down-th/ [https://perma.cc/58DG-N4GQ].
155.
The famous quote often attributed to Desmond Tutu, “If you are neutral in
situations of injustice, you have chosen the side of the oppressor” has been applied out of
context by those who believe that any airing of a variety of views for academic debate
perpetuates injustice, as does the viewpoint neutrality of the First Amendment. See OXFORD
ESSENTIAL QUOTATIONS (Susan Ratcliffe ed., 5th ed. 2017), https://www.oxfordreference.
com/view/10.1093/acref/9780191843730.001.0001/q-oro-ed5-00016497#:~:text=Desmond
%20Tutu%201931%E2%80%93&text=If%20you%20are%20neutral%20in,will%20not%20
appreciate%20your%20neutrality [https://perma.cc/UFN2-B2Y2].
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of “fake news” and deceptive or reductive speech. There is not much First
Amendment doctrine can do to cure our pathologies in discourse and undo the
contradictions its jurisprudence creates, but retaining its general wisdom is needed
now more than ever.

III. CURING FIRST AMENDMENT CONTRADICTIONS
With so much distrust of the First Amendment and, specifically, the
marketplace of ideas, there is an opportunity for courts to either find ways to correct
speech pathologies that have arisen or reaffirm the value of our current system. In
this last Part, I propose that correcting these pathologies in discourse can be
corrected not by restricting First Amendment rights but by reaffirming them.
Cynicism about a process-based First Amendment and a prioritization of other goals
besides truth is creating our problems—it is skepticism of free speech, not free
speech itself, that requires the most adjustments.
First, courts and actors in educational institutions must signal that not only
are reason and emotion, although interrelated, distinct processes but that rational
deliberation requires that ideas of speech and conduct be kept separate. The idea of
“speech as violence” must be resoundingly rejected, and courts must enshrine new
applications of the doctrine that preserve the distinction between physical, concrete
harm and certain types of emotional harm. Second, along with this cementing of our
paradigms, courts should hold that “fake news” can be remedied and regulated only
when it relates to a specific, concrete harm—not a generalized harm to the “public.”
This specific, concrete harm requirement both protects speech as a special category
whose emotional harms we must generally bear and ensures that courts and juries
can attach punishments to speech only when the speech is verifiably true or false,
not when it expresses a view on open, public debates or simplifies important public
issues. While these types of speech are surely problematic, the solution is for people
to better understand their own emotional natures and cognitive biases, not for juries
and courts to begin enshrining them as First Amendment doctrine.
A. Emotional Harms from Speech
Many of our speech pathologies stem from a desire to cater to our collective
and individual emotional frailties or to remedy, either legally or socially, the
emotional harms that come from speech. People chill themselves (or shout down
others) for fear of emotional reactions to speech. People are too often guided by the
initial, emotional response to speech that may or may not represent the most
accurate, comprehensive, nuanced facts and conclusions about a topic. Recent
attention to emotional harm—and perhaps an over-emphasis on protecting people’s
mental health—may actually be making us more emotionally fragile and less
tolerant of speech. This vicious cycle (fixating on mental health and reducing
people’s exposures to stressors, which generally leads individuals to be less
equipped to handle emotional strife) reduces freedoms and erodes free speech and
should not be enshrined in the law.
We cannot rid ourselves of our passions and our prejudices, be they
emotional or cognitive, but courts can signal—through doctrine and through the
language of their opinions—which virtues improve the quality of speech. Deeper
reasoning, confronting our confirmation biases, and appreciating the ways in which
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our identities are bound up in viewpoints are each necessary to improve the goods
in the marketplace of ideas. Better quality, less ideologically motivated education is
also necessary, and intellectual shortcuts and politics via simplified meme should be
discouraged. Some of this social evolution must be cultural and not legal, but there
are a few ways courts can help.
First, educators polarizing over what to include in curriculum and how to
present certain courses would be better served by recognizing which aspects of
certain subjects are about imposing perspectives or conclusions on students and
which are about teaching them to think and giving them the facts, both convenient
and inconvenient to their narratives. Courts can facilitate this process through
doctrines involving academic freedom, by specifying what academic freedom means
and when it should be applied. If courts are to give educational institutions like
universities academic freedom, they must demonstrate a paramount commitment to
academic inquiry, not an ideological mission that trumps the search for truth.
Second, courts can safeguard the rational process and distinguish it from
the emotional joys and downsides of speech. Courts must signal that emotional harm
is a necessary byproduct of a robust, healthy free speech culture and that our
emotions may not be the best guide of what is reasonable discourse. Not only can
the government generally not intervene to protect emotional well-being at the cost
of censorship, but the government must be proactive in protecting citizens from the
heckler’s veto—shutting down others’ speech through force or negating a platform
someone has been freely provided—or guarding against those who claim that speech
is too damaging to others’ emotions.
Courts and academic institutions cannot demonstrate that emotions are a
sacred realm to be protected at the expense of speech. Indeed, often our emotions
are not interpreted correctly or are based on factual inaccuracies or biased thinking
and lead us in damaging directions for discourse. Filter bubbles, fake news, and
appeals through reductive, oversimplified speech are all ways that our emotional
indulgences are damaging discourse. Courts should embrace doctrine sensitive to
the idea that our emotions are not the be-all-end-all and can and should, in many
cases, be overlooked. Our emotions can lead us in new directions and inspire us to
think further on topic or they can show us what we find important, but they are not
the same as logical conclusions on a topic.
For those skeptical of the First Amendment and its current level of
protections, however, these solutions may not be satisfying. Indeed, some may argue
that artificial intelligence in the form of bots has eroded the speech–conduct
distinction, or that our First Amendment jurisprudence favors the status quo. Courts
must do a better job setting boundaries on what is actually speech and explaining
why certain protections are necessary. The next Section details certain doctrinal
changes courts should and should not make.
B. Doctrinal Tweaks and Fake News
As mentioned previously in Part II, listeners often seek out and believe
information that confirms their prior beliefs, solidifies their sense of identity, and
helps form social cohesion based on ideological similarities. Speakers can exploit
this by using sensationalist headlines that do not capture the nuances of the truth
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(knowing some people will not read the full article); by creating simplistic, reductive
narratives about events; and even sometimes by outright lying about facts and
events.
Scholars believe that current pathologies in discourse arise from this
weaponization of speech against speech, often in the form of “fake news.” Fake
news has been defined variously by different scholars, but most definitions involve
(1) an element of intent or purposefulness, (2) dissemination of verifiably false
information, and (3) that dissemination somehow harming the public good.156 Under
our current doctrine, fake news likely cannot be proscribed because, unlike fraud or
defamation, the harm is not specific and concrete (like economic harm from fraud
or reputational harm from defamation) but rather to the public trust and to public
discourse. In United States v. Alvarez, which invalidated a statute that criminalized
lying about receiving a military honor, the Supreme Court required a “clear, limiting
principle” before lies could be proscribed.157 According to the Court, “[o]ur
constitutional tradition stands against the idea that we need Oceania’s Ministry of
Truth.”158 Perhaps someone who contracted the novel coronavirus could claim that
Fox News spread fake news about the vaccine approval processes, and this caused
concrete, material harm in that they contracted coronavirus. Allowance of that type
of lawsuit would give courts and juries the power to adjudicate what is generally
true and false, potentially chilling a great amount of speech and putting great powers
in the hands of the government.
Further, even if fake news could be restricted, any definition of fake news
would be both overinclusive and underinclusive. Any definition of fake news would
be overinclusive, because, if the material and concrete harm element of Alvarez were
broadened, it would be difficult to separate what is true and incomplete from what
is a lie, especially about important, contested issues. Juries, under a court’s direction,
may end up attaching penalties to speech that actually turns out to be true. As Alan
Chen notes, “[i]t simply may be too difficult to provide a workable legal definition
of truth or falsity in the context of public discourse.”159 In defamation, plaintiffs
must allege a reputational injury based on a false statement about themselves. This
not only ensures that individuals are not punished for generalized lies, which may
serve some social function or have political value, but also narrows the range of
punishable speech to that which is generally verifiable. Whether a politician had an
affair is much more easily proven or disproven than broader conclusions from facts
and data, such as whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, whether vaccines
carry too much risk, or whether genetically modified organisms are unsafe to
consume. Although there is scientific or other consensus on many of these topics, it
is based on interpretations of data on a large scale, not single pieces of information
that are more easily proven true or false. If even defamation requires a high standard
of intentionality and verifiably false facts to give breathing room to those whose
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speech might be chilled, punishing fake news about topics of public interest would
certainly chill important speech that is less falsifiable.
Attaching legal remedies to fake news would also be underinclusive
because many of the harms to public discourse come not from speech that is
intentionally false but from those who repeat false speech (although punishing the
originators would mitigate this to some degree) and from those whose narratives, on
topics from Israel to policing in America, are oversimplified and sensationalistic.
The solution to this problem of lower quality information cannot be legislated or
imposed by courts. We must all discipline ourselves not to extrapolate from every
anecdote and to seek out information that may undermine our priors, not just confirm
them. Social media companies (private actors not subject to First Amendment
constraints) must be free to experiment with their own policies, which hopefully will
move away from encouraging the spread of inflammatory information and toward
bolstering people selecting for nuanced takes.160 Social media platforms,
understanding human psychology and the emotional impacts of speech, should
(without targeting viewpoint) take some responsibility in exposing people to a
broader range of speech and encouraging them to engage in meaningful dialogue
with each other to reveal facts to which they may not have been exposed.
Perhaps this is too optimistic. There are some, as Toni Massaro and Helen
Norton describe, “tweaks” that can be made in the doctrine to address major
pathologies in discourse, such as the spread of fake news. One class of tweaks is
speaker-based restrictions, such as election laws that “regulate speakers based on
their foreign identity by barring foreign actors from influencing U.S. elections.” This
type of law could create an easily administrable category that is actually unrelated
to the content or viewpoint of the speech and thus would not embroil courts or
government officials in choosing worthy versus unworthy speech and render them
vulnerable to their own emotional and cognitive biases. (This would somewhat
undermine Massaro and Norton’s claim that the “neutrality” of free speech doctrine
is a false narrative.)161 Election laws of this nature simply target an easily identifiable
class of speakers less entitled to First Amendment protection because of their
diminished interest in our election and the significant concern of foreign
manipulations of our elections. Further, the use of computer-generated speakers or
bots, especially bots from foreign countries, could be susceptible to restrictions. The
regulation of bots can be considered a time, place, and manner restriction on speech
at the margins between speech and conduct because it is not uttered or created by a
human being and is designed to be disruptive to discourse.
Not all tweaks are as easily administrable or as benign to our free speech
fundamentals as others. One reason for increased skepticism of strong free speech
protections has been cases like Citizens United, which invalidated campaign finance
reforms like limitations on corporate and nonprofit expression, such as the
160.
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documentary at issue in the case.162 Some argue that the outcome of Citizens United
is corrosive to democratic values and has created a toxic environment for speech
where the many can speak over the few.163 However, Citizens United is justified in
ways that go far beyond campaign finance reform, and better education about this
to the public could reduce some of the skepticism.164 Targeting corporations for
being less worthy of influencing elections, for example, would affect our expressive
associational rights and punish those for amassing wealth, truly compromising some
of the First Amendment’s formal neutrality and stance against re-distributing speech
opportunities through government intervention. Similarly, dismantling the state
action doctrine to allow more regulation of social media platforms and redistribute
speaking power would allow government actors—with emotional and cognitive
biases similar to the population—too much power in controlling the marketplace of
ideas. However, when government actors threaten private parties to induce them to
censor speech or investigate private parties about their speech policies, the state
action threshold has likely been crossed.
Indeed, our foundational First Amendment values are needed now more
than ever. These values can signal how to have productive discourse. Because the
First Amendment generally does not regard the emotional harm caused by speech
on a matter of public concern as compensable,165 courts are signaling that we cannot
let cognitive or emotional biases drive discourse—either through stifling discourse
due to the distressing nature of speech, which sometimes undermines our sense of
self to the very core, or through allowing those emotionally upset by speech to turn
to violence to combat speech. The speech–conduct distinction preserves and elevates
rational processes, even while forbidding courts to censor the tenuous differences
between rational and emotional appeals. The speech–conduct distinction is needed
now more than ever, as people sometimes turn to or justify violence based on others’
speech. Ensuring a high bar before speech becomes violence signals, as Judge Royce
Lamberth did when he rejected “Q-Anon Shaman” Jacob Anthony Chansley’s
motion for pretrial release,166 that we must exercise our own judgment in response
to speech and are responsible for our rational processing. Lawmakers should
strengthen penalties for engaging in violence in response to speech, and individuals
should sue institutions for not better safeguarding them against the heckler’s veto
when audiences shout down or threaten speakers.
We also need people to show intellectual and emotional fortitude, including
a willingness to speak out despite the unpopularity of adding nuance to debate within
one’s own political circles. We need social media platforms to reflect better on how
162.
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best to combat discourse pathologies and encourage sophisticated interactions. And
we need our viewpoint-neutral First Amendment, which accounted for concerns of
cognitive and emotional biases in government actors before behavioral science
studied how these biases affected listeners, to give them the freedom to do so.
Indeed, the very essence of the First Amendment contains the signals for how to
proceed. It is those who are skeptical of the foundational values of the First
Amendment and of the idea that clashing debates will lead to truth—those who wish
to censor through online harassment or mass retaliation, those who spread
misleading information to win over supporters for their cause, and those who tie
speech to identity so closely that they do not examine their own view—who are
aggravating our speech pathologies.

CONCLUSION
We live in an age of skepticism about the marketplace-of-ideas metaphor
and about the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence more generally.
When low-quality speech proliferates and people feel threatened by retaliation just
for entering the marketplace of ideas, the contradictions created by free speech
doctrine and the pathologies present in our current state of public discourse become
even more apparent. Yet these contradictions of the First Amendment’s doing
cannot be solved by restructuring First Amendment doctrine.
Those who truly, as a matter of principle, accept the marketplace-of-ideas
metaphor are least likely to purposely contribute to discourse pathologies. Courts
and educators need only embrace this aspirational notion that the clash of ideas leads
to truth for it to increasingly become a self-fulfilling prophesy. Traditional free
speech doctrine does not allow emotion to eclipse the need for people to expose
themselves to uncomfortable speech. This process perhaps inoculates them and
makes them stronger so they can challenge their own emotional responses and
rational biases, and truly engage in nuanced discussions. The speech–conduct
distinction permits speech unless it gets exceptionally close to yielding conduct
(such as incitement), and courts and lawmakers should encourage people to express
themselves and discourage the use of violence or the heckler’s veto in response to
speech. Signaling strongly that speech is for rational, safe, informed discourse but
that any violence in response to speech will be seriously punished may even
incentivize those looking to inflame or appeal to emotions to use other tactics.
Courts would do a great service to free speech protections and free speech culture
to prioritize the truth-seeking functions of speech. We must all be attentive to
corrosive influences on the marketplace of ideas.

